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WILEY B. RUTLEDGE, 1894-1949
RALPH F. FUCHS*
In the memorial service for Justice Wiley B. Rutledge in
Washington, D. C., following his death, the following words were
spoken: "Of some men who have risen to renown in public life,
it might be said that they have won much esteem but little
affection; of others it might be said that they have been loved
more than they were esteemed; but of him whom we mourn today,
it can be said that he won both love and esteem in equal and overflowing measure."
The press accounts of Justice Rutledge and his work, which
followed his passing, seemed to reflect this estimate of him. They
stressed his integrity and feeling for his fellow man, along with
his work as teacher and jurist. Clearly, despite the limited channels through which the educator and the judge must strive, his
personality and his character had impressed themselves not only
* A.B., Washington University; Ph.D., Robert Brookings Graduate
School; LL.B., Washington University School of Law; J.S.D., Yale University School of Law; Professor of Law, University of Indiana School
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upon those who knew him or who knew his work professionally,
but also upon the larger community of those who keep in touch
with affairs. In the memory of his human influence, as well as
in his writings in the law reports, his lasting contribution to the
Nation's life and heritage lies recorded.
Wiley Rutledge was a great man, as some of us who were acquainted with him in his earlier years came quickly to realize.
His fine sense of values, his keen analysis of issues, his effort
in behalf of all just causes, the warmth and zeal of his friendship: these marked him as a rare human being whom it was one
of life's highest privileges to know. Few men could have become
simultaneously, as he did while he was in St. Louis, a leader of
his profession and his University, a force in behalf of progressive
causes, a participant in the discussions of the most learned
town-and-gown organization in his community, and a welcome
member of a business men's service club. His record was the
same in the smaller communities in which he lived. When he
entered the judiciary in 1939, he took with him an acute sensitivity to the character of the people whom he was to serve in a
new capacity, along with the love which he bore them.
Nor did Wiley Rutledge's close touch with people end with his
elevation to the bench. At the cost, in some degree, of the volume
of his work as a judge, he continued to be available as few judges,
at least of the Supreme Court, are, to his friends and to groups
throughout the country that sought his presence and his utterances. At times his strength was severely taxed by these associations; but he could not bring himself to limit them more strictly.
On the bench, Justice Rutledge made major contributions in
both of the courts on which he served. On the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia he did much to
develop and liberalize important areas of the District's nonstatutory law. His opinion in The President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (1942), with regard
to the tort liability of a charitable corporation, will be a leading
one for a long time to come. In Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. 2d 865
(1941), through skillful analysis and application of existing
doctrine, he found a basis for enlarged procedural safeguards
to persons arrested for crime. In statutory interpretation too,
the life-giving quality of this judicial method emerged in Jordan
v. Group Health Association, 107 F. 2d 239 (1939), and in his
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dissent in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 135
F. 2d 785 (1943). In Bwsey v. District of Columbia, 129 F. 2d 24
(1942), he espoused in dissent the view which his vote in another
case the following fall was to make the majority view of the
Supreme Court, that the First Amendment invalidates a license
tax upon the distribution of religious literature on the streets
of a city and the receipt of contributions in return.
This period on the Court of Appeals, I think, brought forth
much of Justice Rutledge's finest professional work; for in it the
judicial novitiate, devoting himself with singleness of purpose
to the grist that litigation brought before him, displayed a sureness of touch and produced a solidity in results, such as adjudication in the Supreme Court can rarely be made to yield. In that
highest tribunal the merciless pressure of work, the continuous
impact of major controversy, and the necessity of ofttimes working with less finely articulated doctrine than the common law
yields, produce a different type of jurisprudence. In it the statesman's vision, penetrating the smoke of controversy, rather than
the craftsman's competence, tend to shape the resulting product.
Legal structures half begun, while conflict over their soundness
continues to rage, may be all that can be attempted, to commend
themselves or not to the builders who will follow, as the event
must prove.
In this larger forum too, Wiley Rutledge left his mark. With
Mr. Justice Murphy, he became the prophet of the most advanced
social justice and the most thoroughgoing insistence upon civil
liberty represented on the Court. Whether his position will be
vindicated must turn largely upon whether the future can be
made to yield fulfillment of some of the richest promises of
American life.
Time is not available, so soon after Justice Rutledge's death,
to attempt a scholarly evaluation of his work on the High Court.
The minds and hands of many will be directed to that task in the
months and years ahead. Few are likely to dissent, one hazards,
from certain observations that may here be set down. His
opinion for the Court in Labor Board v. Hearst Publications,322
U. S. 111 (1944), is an example of vitalizing statutory interpretation at its best. The opinion in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946), is among the best encyclopedic
opinions in the books. His opinion in three state sales tax cases,
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dissenting in one and concurring in two (reported with International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, at
349), brings economic considerations to bear with great insight
and skill, as does his later, related concurrence in Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249 (1946). His partial dissent in Hartford
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), enunciates a
sound philosophy of vigorous, clean-cut judicial enforcement of
the antitrust laws. His analysis of a vital segment of lawyers'
law, accompanied by complete judicial integrity and detachment,
rises to high levels in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330
U. S. 259 (1947). His opinion of the Court in Thomas v. Collins,
323 U. S. 516 (1945), enunciates limits to legislative regulation
of public utterance with a clarity rarely equalled. Speaking for
the Court in Prince.v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 159 (1944), he
reveals a finely-balanced scale of values, refusing to erect religious freedom into a dogma that would prevail over the state's
power to maintain statutory safeguards to the welfare of children. Dissenting in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 (1947), he boldly laid the groundwork for constitutional protection against religious intrusion into the public schools, which
the Court after~iard built upon in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
There is little need to speak here of limitations which most
commentators will doubtless perceive in some of Justice Rutledge's work: of the unnecessary length of many opinions, produced in part, at least, by a conscientiousness that was unwilling
to relinquish a problem until its minutest aspects had been laid
bare; of the occasional over-ingeniousness of the argument that
led to a desired conclusion, as in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S.
416 (1946); or of the flat refusal to follow where established
principles led, because vital human interests seemed at stake,
in his dissent in Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 (1946).
Greater weaknesses than these might be forgiven, even where
the causes that produced them were less admirable.
Justic Rutledge's greatest opinion, even in the judgment of a
posterity that cannot share the memory of its oral delivery, may
well be his dissent in In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946). Here
noble utterance and rare professional skill combine to bring
forth a charter for freedom and decency, even in the face of
total war, which we reject at our peril. "It is not too early," he
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said, "it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to follow
its great consitutional traditions, none older or more universally
protective against unbridled power than due process of law in
the trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether
citizens, aliens, alien enemies, or enemy belligerents." He was
right. The gap between his understanding and the nation's performance is the measure of the stature to which he rose and of
the distance we must travel if humanity is indeed to achieve its
destiny.

RESOLUTION
Adopted at 24th Annual Meeting of the National Bar Association
in Indianapolis, Indiana, September 17, 1949*

The National Bar Association has noted with profound regret
the deaths of Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge of
the United States Supreme Court. Their passing is a loss to all
Americans who are devoted to the democratic way of life and it
is an especially poignant loss to members of minority groups.
Their devotion to democratic principles, their legal scholarship
and their understanding of the problems of our society inevitably
ranged them on the side of civil rights and civil liberties. Their
opinions in cases involving the rights of Japanese, in issues affecting labor and in the variety of cases concerning constitutional
rights of Negroes are magnificent expressions of belief in the
democratic process. The National Bar Association extends its
sympathy to their families in their loss.
The impact of their lives on civilization will continue to be a
beacon light that will unquestionably brighten man's pathway in
his ceaseless struggle for the better satisfaction of life.
Respectfully submitted,
Loren Miller
J. R. Booker
Harold E. Bledsoe
Chester K. Gillespie, Chairman
* An article on Justice Murphy will appear in the next issue of the
NATIONAL BAR JOURNAL.

